Australia must accept some responsibility for treatment of Iraqi prisoners

Tony Smith*
July 2004
Published at: acmica.org

As details accumulated regarding who knew what and when about the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners, Australian Cabinet tempers frayed. The Foreign and Defence Ministers argued that Opposition probing in Parliamentary Committee and Chamber denigrates defence personnel risking their lives in Iraq. While their assertion that Australian troops have not committed atrocities is correct, this observation is not relevant to questions about the actions of Ministers. By joining the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, the Australian Government encouraged the US to believe that its invasion of Iraq was justifiable, and so Australia as a nation bears some responsibility for all aspects of the occupation.

Whether the Opposition manages to embarrass the Government depends on many factors, but regardless of the outcome of that party contest, there is a broader question of national responsibility. In seeking to understand Australia’s role in the torture scandal, history is informative. In April, critics of the lengthening Iraq occupation cited precedents from the 1960s and 1970s, while supporters denied that ‘Iraq’ was another ‘Vietnam’.

In a highly competitive political system where even a marginal election winner takes all spoils, it is not surprising that politicians use military analogies, suggesting for example that a Premier met his Waterloo, or that the cavalry was on the way. Politicians use history rhetorically to make immediate connections in the public mind rather than to construct lasting theories. Government claims that Opposition Leader Mark Latham was a friend of terrorists for wanting Australian troops home by Christmas, show that logic is foreign to this discourse. When Latham raised the Vietnam connection however, supporters of Australian involvement resorted to literal interpretation.

The sceptics on the Vietnam-Iraq comparison make contradictory claims. They describe Iraq’s unique features, but ground their comments in differences from Vietnam. But if Vietnam is irrelevant, then the contrasts are pointless. Obviously, the campaigns differ. Vietnam was not a Muslim country, and there are female troops with weapons on the side of the invaders this time, whereas in Vietnam, females featured mainly as guerrillas, nurses or victims. However, the contrasts rely on a basis for comparison.

Comparisons are not absolute but relative. Circumstances are more or less similar, and the Iraq-Vietnam comparison sits on a continuum between strong and weak. In terms of aiding understanding, there are strong similarities. Both are wars waged chiefly by the USA. While we refer to ‘the Vietnam War’, the people most closely concerned, those who still trip over mines and bear babies genetically affected by Agent Orange, refer to ‘the American War’. What we call ‘the Iraq campaign’ will become similarly known.

For Australians, a Coalition Government committed troops to both enterprises. In 1963 and 2003, many Australians believed that the Government used deception to justify following the US lead. In Vietnam as American casualties mounted, self-interest, rather than ethical doubt, turned opinion against the war. Meanwhile, American strategists suggested that Australian military leaders adopt a more aggressive, US style campaign, and pressured political leaders to commit more troops. The Howard Government’s wise decision to strictly limit our Iraq force is almost certainly based on lessons from Vietnam.

Supporters of invasion insist that the contexts differ, but use comparisons when convenient. American strategists cite a ‘reverse domino theory’ - instead of Vietnam creating communism in its neighbours, Iraq will infect other dictatorships with democracy. Prime Minister Howard promoted welcome home parades for Iraq veterans, claiming that Vietnam veterans did not receive such parades. However, a real historian, Mark McKenna (in Why the War Was Wrong, ed. Raimond Gaita), exposes these loose arguments. Howard’s rush to recruit patriotic fervour used false history because Vietnam returnees did have parades. Such distortions are common among neoconservatives, who have sought to revise history to support ungenerous policies towards the rights of Indigenous peoples.

Australia’s associational problems began after the attacks of September 2001. While the Prime Minister was statesmanlike in expressing sympathy and support for the USA, his unqualified backing for President Bush’s campaign for revenge and justice presaged problems. In Afghanistan, hunting Osama bin Laden and in Iraq with President Hussein, its language was extreme. Australia, which has abolished capital punishment, joined a posse that looked suspiciously like a lynch mob. Mr Howard made his opinion clear when he approved the possibility that an Indonesian court could execute the men convicted of the murderous Bali bombings.

In appreciating how allies share responsibility for actions, comparison with the war in Vietnam is useful. Among several abiding images from that war is the photograph of a prisoner being executed summarily by a South Vietnamese officer (see War Photos That Changed History, Downloaded 7 June 2004). The US was rightly held responsible for the actions of its ally. Whether or not individuals were prosecuted, this event eroded public support for the war.

In 2004, images of abuse of Iraqi prisoners have similar impact. No-one implies that Australian soldiers have participated in, approved, or even observed the mistreatment, so the reactions of Ministers do not counter the criticisms. Accusations are not directed at military personnel but at the government that protracted the war. As Australia has marched under the Coalition flag since late 2002, our international reputation depends on the behaviour of the whole Coalition. While our responsibility is indirect, we are answerable for the treatment of prisoners. Indeed, there is a sense in which Iraq as a country is a prisoner, and so we are responsible for all deaths occurring since we became its jailer.

Denial of personal responsibility damages society. This makes significant a statement of regret by Tom Frame, Anglican Bishop and military chaplain. Frame (Sydney Morning Herald, 22 June 2004) admits that he was wrong to support the war, even though he decided on information available at the time. He concludes that rather than being a just war, the Iraq adventure was after all, just a war. The bishop’s principled statement contrasts starkly with the evasiveness of those Australians who admit no responsibility for negative events in Iraq, but boast about what they regard as the positive results of the invasion. With the cautionary example of the wars in Indo-China to guide us, Australians really should have performed more ethically over the crisis in Iraq.

See also:
Film review: In Shifting Sands by Scott Ritter, ‘The WMD sophistry: let’s move on’ AQ 75(4) July-August
2004; and
Tony Smith, ‘There is no excuse for the torture of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib’ On Line Opinion, Posted 21 May 2004.

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* Tony Smith is a writer based in country NSW. He holds a PhD in political science.